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Abstract
This paper employs a generational comparison to examine how
increasing labor market informality has affected how poor households
in Egypt gain access to and rely on social protection schemes. Using a
qualitative approach rare in research on social protection, the analysis
relies on a set of 53 in-depth interviews conducted in Cairo and rural
areas of Qena governorate. The interview sample was structured to
enable a comparison of social protection access among young (age 20 – 33)
and older (age 50 – 65) adults, and among men and women. The results
indicate that among the generation of Egyptians approaching retirement,
the expansion of public employment and a policy allowing easy access
to survivors’ benefits among female dependents served as important
means of increasing social insurance coverage. However, many young
households do not have even one member enrolled in the public pension
system. Labor market instability and informality have also lowered the
perceived value of social protection among this generation. In conclusion,
the paper discusses five common points of vulnerability across the four
groups studied: labor force discontinuity among workers in the private
sector, women’s dependence on survivor benefits, low pension values,
poor quality of and limited access to health insurance, and, finally, lack
of awareness of social protection mechanisms and poor understanding of
how they function. All of these factors may create significant barriers to
social protection access among poor households, and must be addressed if
coverage rates are to be extended, or even maintained, in the future.

1. Introduction
Researchers and practitioners have increasingly been turning to the
social protection framework as an approach to poverty alleviation in
the Global South. Moving beyond the concept of the social safety net
that accompanied structural adjustment programs in the 1990s, social
protection adopts a more integrated approach to poverty alleviation
that focuses on reducing risk and vulnerability (Kabeer 2009). The social
protection framework has thus developed along with increasing interest
in the study of poverty dynamics, as well as non-monetary dimensions of
poverty, including exclusion and insecurity (Norton et al. 2002; Barrientos
et al. 2005; Barrientos and Hulme 2009).
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Despite this growing interest in social protection, little qualitative
research has directly addressed how citizens of developing countries view
and access different social protection mechanisms. Social protection is
more often brought into qualitative work at the conclusions stage, serving
as a framework for policy recommendations resulting from studies that are
focused on poverty dynamics (see, for example, Davis 2011).1 This paper
aims to address this gap by questioning how poor households in Egypt
access different social protection schemes and how they perceive the value
of those schemes. It also aims to identify key vulnerabilities in terms of
gaps in social protection access for different population groups. Egypt is
in interesting case in which to examine such questions during a period
of economic and political change, as it is a country with extensive legal
social protection mechanisms, the efficacy of which have been challenged
by economic liberalization and labor market informalization. Recent
political change in Egypt has also stalled existing efforts to reform the
social protection system, while at the same time creating new legislative
openings in a variety of areas.
The paper draws on 53 in-depth interviews conducted in a rural and
an urban location. The qualitative fieldwork was structured to provide
a comparison between the older generation of Egyptians approaching
retirement and the younger generation of recent graduates that has faced
a privatizing labor market. The findings point to several common sources
of vulnerability across different generational and gender groups, including
labor force discontinuity among workers in the private sector, a high level
of dependence on survivor benefits among women, low pension values, and
the poor quality of the public health insurance system. Finally, although
trust in the public sector pension system was high, and the idea of formal
social protection was valued in the abstract, low awareness of how Egypt’s
social protection systems actually functioned was an important barrier to
access among all groups.

2. Background
Research on access to different social protection schemes in the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA) has lagged behind other regions, notably
Latin America and South Asia. However, there is a great need to address
poverty and vulnerability in MENA given the difficult labor market
conditions that have prevailed throughout the region over the past two
1

An important exception is Goudge et al. (2009), who examine factors affecting access to publicly provided
health care services in South Africa among households with at least one chronically ill member.
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decades (see Moghadam 1998; Dhillon and Yousef, eds. 2009), and during
the aftermath of the Arab Spring in particular. Egypt is no exception to
these regional trends, and has struggled with high youth unemployment,
growing informalization of the labor market, and low wage levels since
the late 1990s (see Assaad, ed. 2009). The national economic slowdown
following the January 25th, 2011 revolution, in combination with the largescale return of migrant laborers who have been affected by other conflicts
in the region, has led to further concerns over Egypt’s long-term economic
prospects and their implications for poverty.2
For the purposes of this paper, social protection is defined following the
International Labor Organization’s (ILO) rights-based approach, in which
social protection is conceived of as a set of policies and programs that
“protect against low or declining living standards arising out of a number
of basic risks and needs” (van Ginneken 2003b, p. 11, cited in Barrientos
and Hulme 2009). Specifically, social protection is designed to insure
against vulnerability to sudden losses of income associated with events
such as health crises, disability, old age, maternity, or unemployment (ILO
2009). The life course perspective adopted in this paper is based on this
conception of social protection as providing insurance against points in
the individual life course and the family life cycle when populations are at
their most vulnerable (Barrientos et al. 2005).

The social protection system in Egypt
Egypt, like many other countries in MENA, has an extensive social
protection system in law. The ILO categorizes Egypt as having a “semicomprehensive” social security system that includes coverage in case of
old age, sickness, maternity, employment injury, and unemployment, as
well as survivor benefits (ILO 2010: 203). Social insurance coverage is
mandatory for workers in the public and private sectors, as well as for the
self-employed. For wage workers in the public and private sectors, total
contribution rates for social insurance are high, reaching 41% of the basic
wage and 25% of the variable wage (the latter constituting bonuses, profit
shares and other forms of non-regular remuneration). These contributions
are split between the worker (14% of the basic wage and 10% of the variable
wage), the employer (26% of the basic wage and 15% of the variable wage)
and the government (1% of the variable wage, in addition to making up for
any budget deficits) (Helmy 2008).
2

Prior to the revolution, in 2005, the poverty rate in Egypt reached 19.6% with an additional 21.0% near poor.
Combining the poor and near-poor categories approximates the commonly used $2 per day international
poverty standard (World Bank 2007).
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Workers who make social insurance contributions for a minimum of
120 months are eligible for a pension at age 60, and those with 240 months
of contributions are eligible for early retirement at any age. However, the
value of this pension is calculated based on the salary level during the last
two years of employment only.3 In the case of the death of a pensioner or
an individual eligible for a pension, benefits may pass to the deceased’s
eligible survivors. The pension value is divided between eligible survivors
according to a complex legal schedule; those eligible to receive benefits
include widows, a widower if disabled, dependent sons and brothers under
age 21 (26 if a student), unmarried sisters and daughters regardless of age,
and dependent parents (SSA 2011).
Covered workers are also eligible to receive compensation in case
of disability, workplace injury and unemployment (SSA 2011). Women
covered under social insurance are also legally entitled to three months of
paid maternity leave for up to three children (SSA 2011). In addition, under
Egyptian labor law, women working in establishments with more than
50 employees are also entitled to up to two years of unpaid childrearing
leave per child.4 Publicly-provided health insurance is legally compulsory
for certain groups, including formal sector workers and pensioners, and
is provided through the Health Insurance Organization (HIO). HIO
operates a national network of facilities through which it provides services
to those covered by health insurance (Maeda and El Saharty 2008).
Social insurance covering old age, disability and survivor benefits is
also mandatory for the self-employed in Egypt (Helmy 2008). The selfemployed can self-declare their level of insurable income, with the monthly
contribution set at 15% of the declared income. Pension eligibility is at
age 65 with 120 months of contributions.5 A similar system exists to cover
Egyptians working abroad, but for this group social insurance coverage is
optional (Helmy 2008).
Egypt also has several publicly-funded social assistance schemes, which
are targeted primarily towards widows, divorcees, orphans, invalids and
the aged. However, as discussed further below, social assistance programs
do not reach the majority of Egypt’s poor, and for those who do receive
assistance, the amounts are very small (Loewe 2004).

3

4
5

Under certain circumstances, for private sector employees the pension may be calculated based on the five
years of wages prior to the last two years before retirement. For public sector employees, the pension is
always calculated based on the last two years (SSA 2011).
Labor law Number 12 of 2003, available at http://www.egypt.gov.eg/english/laws/pdf/Book2.pdf
Law 108 of 1976.
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Coverage of the social protection system
The ILO (2009) has also noted that most countries in the MENA region
lack a comprehensive, coordinated social protection policy, an assessment
that applies well to Egypt despite its fairly extensive legal social protection
system. Egypt’s social protection system suffers from lack of efficacy,
particularly in terms of poor coordination between systems, the failure
to reach many population groups in need, and the unequal distribution of
benefits among groups that do receive them (Loewe 2004; World Bank
2006). These weaknesses have contributed both to shaping the current
distribution social protection coverage and to the challenges Egypt faces
in maintaining or expanding coverage in the future.
Although social assistance has come to play a particularly prominent
role in discourse and practice as a means to extend social protection to
the poorest populations in the Global South (ILO 2010; Barrientos 2011),
in Egypt social insurance has thus far been a much more common means
of accessing social protection. Among the current generation of older
households in which the head is age 60 or above, 63.4% were receiving
a public contributory (social insurance) pension as of 2006, whereas
only 12.7% were receiving a public non-contributory (social assistance)
pension. Receipt of non-contributory pensions is concentrated among
female-headed households, of whom 15.6% were receiving a pension in
2006, compared to 4.4% of male-headed households. Non-contributory
pensions are also more prevalent in rural areas, where poverty rates are
higher than in urban ones.6 However, overall the World Bank estimates that
public social assistance reaches less than 12% of Egypt’s poor (2006: 35).
The important role of social insurance in providing social protection
coverage in Egypt is a result of public employment policies put in place
during the early 1960s that guaranteed government jobs to all graduates of
vocational secondary, vocational post-secondary, and university education.
This policy led to a prominent role for the government in national
employment, particularly among women; the public sector quickly came to
define the standard for a family-friendly, socially acceptable job (Barsoum
2004; Assaad 2007). As public sector employees enjoy a particularly
privileged position in Egypt’s social protection system, receiving pension,
health, injury, maternity and unemployment benefits (Loewe 2004), the
expansion of public employment played a significant role in expanding
social protection. However, in the early 1990s, Egypt began implementing
a structural adjustment program that precipitated a significant decline in
public sector hiring. Achieving full social protection coverage through the
labor market – or even maintaining current levels of coverage – thus faces
several challenges moving forward.
6

Author’s calculations based on the 2006 Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS).
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First, labor force participation among women in Egypt is low and, among
some groups, declining. Only 26.9% of Egyptian women were engaged in
market work in 2006. Of those, 45% were engaged in non-wage work,
which typically takes place in a family setting and is unlikely to provide
benefits (Assaad and El Hamidi 2009: 224, 227). Women have also been
particularly hard-hit by the reduction in public sector hiring, and appear
to be withdrawing from the labor force rather than accepting jobs in the
private sector. Employment-to-population ratios among women declined
over the period from 1988 to 2006 for all levels of education for which
the public employment guarantees used to apply (Assaad and El Hamidi
2009: 234). This means that a large percentage of the female population
in Egypt is not directly covered by contributory pensions, placing them in
the more vulnerable position of reliance on social assistance, shared family
benefits, or survivor benefits in order to access social protection. Although
the assumption that women will gain access to social protection through
extended family structures is built into many national social protection
systems, this is not necessarily the ideal mechanism for reducing women’s
vulnerability (Sabates-Wheeler and Kabeer 2003).
Second, the decline in public sector hiring has largely been made up
for through growth in Egypt’s informal economy. The public sector shrank
from 39 percent of total employment in 1998 to 30 percent in 2006. The
private formal sector, while growing fairly rapidly since the late 1990s, has
not been able to absorb the number of workers who were once tracked into
government employment. During the same period, informal employment –
defined as employment without a contract or social insurance registration
– has thus increased from 57% of total employment in 1998 to 61% in 2006
(Assaad 2009).7 Like many developing countries, Egypt is thus facing the
prospect of stagnant and even declining social protection coverage (van
Ginneken 2003a; Barrientos and Hulme 2009).
The informalization of Egypt’s labor market has affected its younger
generations in particular. With the public sector closed to most new labor
market entrants, and the youth (age 15 – 29) unemployment rate reaching
15.8% under a standard definition and 21.5% including the discouraged
unemployed (Population Council 2010: 96), the informal sector has
become a common path for labor market entry. Whereas in the early
1970s about 20% of workers started out in the informal sector, by 1998 this
had risen to 69% (Moktar and Wahba 2002). Table 1 shows the percentage
of those currently in the labor force that were enrolled in social insurance
as of 2006 by age group. Among men, a consistent decline is observed
from the oldest age group (50 – 59) to the youngest (25 – 29); among the
7

Unfortunately, reliable period data are not available from earlier years.
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latter, less than a third were covered by social insurance. Among women,
social insurance enrollment declines from its peak in the 40 – 49 year old
age group to a low of 36.9% among those 25 – 29.8 It is also notable that at
across age groups, social insurance coverage is significantly lower among the
rural population, declining to a low of 22.8% of rural workers age 25 – 29.

Table 1: Percentage of current workers enrolled in social insurance, by age group, gender
and residence (2006)
Age Group
25-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
Total

Male

Female

Urban

Rural

Total

31.8
47.2
61.5
62.5
40.6

36.9
45.2
53.5
44.6
38.7

45.1
59.9
73.5
77.3
56.2

22.8
36.2
46.5
40.8
28.4

32.7
46.7
59.2
58.2
40.2

Note: The age range was restricted to above 25 to avoid censoring due to education, and to below 60 because
this is the mandatory retirement age for public sector workers.
Source: Author›s calculations from the 2006 Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey

These figures could indicate a life-cycle model in which workers start
out in the informal sector and then move into formal employment as they
gain experience. Based on research in Latin America, Maloney (1999; 2004)
has suggested that the informal sector may serve as a ‘training ground’
for young workers. However, in the context of Egypt, existing evidence
indicates that mobility out of the informal sector is low, particularly
for the low-educated (Ahlburg and Amer 2003; Wahba 2009; Amer and
Simmonet 2008). Among workers aged 20 – 50 engaged in informal private
non-agricultural wage work in 1998, only 7.4% moved to formal private
work by 2006 (Wahba 2009). There is also a strong gender dynamic to
mobility out of informality; Wahba (2009) found that nearly 80% of those
who successfully moved to the formal sector were male, while Amer and
Simmonet (2008) find that most mobility experienced by young women
in informal employment was through labor market exit. This agrees
with qualitative findings that poor conditions, lack of security, and lack
of benefits are barriers to women’s participation in the private sector
(Barsoum 2004; Barsoum et al. 2009).
8

Among the youngest age group (25–29), it is likely that social insurance coverage rates are higher among
women than among men because women are more likely to remain out of the labor force if they are unable
to find a high quality job, which is widely perceived to mean formal, preferably public, employment (Barsoum 2004; Population Council 2010).
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The potential implications of informalization for social protection
access among Egypt’s younger generations are thus of considerable
concern. Informal workers by definition lack contracts and social
insurance, leaving them and their families without pensions in older age or
in case of disability. Barring significant mobility into the formal sector or
access to other forms of social protection, Egypt’s young generations seem
likely to suffer from little income support in retirement. Most informal
workers also lack paid leaves and health insurance, making them vulnerable
to health shocks. According to the ILO, such “lack of protection against
catastrophic health expenditure is one of the critical factors contributing
to vulnerability and poverty” (2009: 6). In short, while Egypt, like many
other countries in MENA, has an extensive social protection system
on the books, the combination of economic restructuring and rapid
demographic growth has strained these programs (World Bank 2006),
leading to growing questions about the extent to which they are accessible
to those who really need them.

Do the poor value social protection?
On the other hand, some international literature has argued that
workers may not value social protection to the degree that researchers and
policy makers tend to expect. Van Ginneken argues that many “workers
outside the formal sector are not able or willing to contribute a relatively
high percentage of their incomes to finance social security benefits that
do not meet their priority needs” (2003a: 66). In other words, formal
social protection, which aims to provide for future consumption during
periods when individuals are unable to earn an income through the labor
market, may not function well to cover the immediate consumption needs
of the poor. Poor households may thus see little incentive to participate in
social protection, i.e. to save part of today’s some income for the future,
particularly for those living day-to-day (Norton et al. 2002). There is some
support for such claims in Egypt; in a study of job quality among young
female workers, Barsoum et al. (2009) found that some did not want social
insurance primarily because this would deduct from their already low
salaries. Poor understanding of how social protection systems work may
also discourage participation (van Ginneken 2003a), as well as mistrust of
the government that manages those schemes (Maloney 2004).
Reviewing literature on the informal sector in Latin America, Maloney
(2004) has also argued that participation in formal social protection
schemes may in fact have low returns under certain conditions. First, the
quality and reliability of public benefits may be quite low in some countries,
reducing the incentive to pay contributions in order to get these benefits. In
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the case of rural South Africa, Gouge et al. (2009) found that poor services
and costs associated with accessing benefits (particularly transportation)
reduced use of free health services. Burdensome bureaucratic procedures
were also found to prevent some households from applying for forms of
social assistance to which they were entitled.
Second, the benefits of social protection programs may be shared
within the household (e.g. in cases where health insurance enrollment is
extended to dependents), reducing the incentive for multiple household
members to pay contributions. Furthermore, poor enforcement of labor
law in many countries means that private sector establishments have
significant leeway in ‘choosing’ the extent and level of their participation
in social protection schemes (Maloney 2004). In Egypt, for example,
employers commonly under-report the salaries of their employees to the
social insurance administration in order to reduce contribution payments.
Employees, in turn, have little incentive to oppose this practice except
during the last two years prior to retirement, as this is the only period in
which their pension value is based (Loewe 2004).
Finally, in a wide range of developing country contexts, social networks
and transfers make up an extensive system of informal social protection on
which the poor may rely more extensively than formal schemes (Morduch
and Sharma 2002; Maloney 2004; Tesliuc and Lindert 2004; Goudge
2009; Davis 2011). This appears to be true in MENA, in which the World
Bank (2006: 35) states that the volume of informal and non-governmental
(including religious) transfers far outweighs public social assistance in all
countries for which evidence exists. In Egypt, a recent study conducted
in Ismailia showed that intergenerational transfers between parents and
children are extensive, with female family members of both generations
more likely to be transfer recipients (Yount et al. 2012). The important
role of informal community networks, and particularly rotating savings
and credit associations (ROSCAs), in household saving and consumption
has also been well noted in ethnographic literature (see, for example,
Singerman 1995; Hoodfar 1997).
It is difficult, however, to make general statements regarding the efficacy
of informal safety nets relative to formal social protection mechanisms.
Many of the same scholars who have pointed to the importance of such
informal transfers have also argued that they are not always reliable
(van Ginneken 2003a; Loewe 2004; Goudge et al. 2009), and that their
efficacy as a safety net varies considerably across social contexts and
groups (Morduch and Sharma 2002). Nevertheless, informal mechanisms
certainly play an important role in complementing – or substituting for –
formal social protection, and may well influence how poor households
think about the value of such formal schemes.
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3. Method
The analysis in this paper in based on in-depth interviews conducted
in Cairo and rural Qena, a governorate in Upper Egypt, which is the
poorest (World Bank 2007) and most conservative region of Egypt. The
interview sample was structured to form a comparison between two
generations: older adults at or approaching retirement age (50 – 65), who
are of the generation that benefitted greatly from the expansion of public
employment in the 1960s and 1970s, and young adults (age 20 – 33) who
have entered the labor market during the period of public sector decline.
This design allows for an analysis of how labor market informalization has
affected access to social protection, as well as a comparison of how the
generation with much closer proximity to old age and retirement views
the importance of social protection relative to the younger generation.
The study population was defined as the working poor, or what is
commonly referred to as the ‘popular’ (sha’abi) classes in ethnographic
literature on Egypt (Singerman 1995; Hoodfar 1997). This population was
chosen because it is the socioeconomic class for whom the amounts of
income typically distributed through social protection programs in Egypt
– anywhere from 12 to 120 USD per month9 – may have a significant impact
on household spending power. Given the lack of qualitative literature
focused on social protection, an exploratory design was adopted in order
to reach a range of respondents with different forms of access to social
protection mechanisms. Interviewees were chosen based on a purposeful
sampling technique, in which a set number of individuals who fit predetermined categories based on age, sex, labor force participation, and
access to social insurance or social assistance were interviewed. Education
level was not used as an additional sampling criterion because the criteria
used already lead to a wide distribution in respondent characteristics
within a fairly small sample. It is worth noting that due to this, the sample
may be biased toward the more educated, because many of the labor force
categories sampled (particularly those with social insurance) tend to be
dominated by the more educated.
Fourteen interviews were conducted with young adults (seven female,
seven male), and 13 with older adults (seven female, six male) in Cairo.
9

It is important to highlight here that the aim of this paper, as with most qualitative research, is not to make
generalizable statements about social protection access at the population level, and it is therefore not
necessary to have a large representative sample. Rather, the aim of this qualitative analysis is to illustrate
the hows and whys of individual values and decision-making issues that are often difficult to address with
quantitative data. Hence, in illustrating the challenges faced by some individuals and households in terms
of accessing social protection, this study does not make the claim that these are problems common to the
majority of Egyptian households, but points to issues that are worthy of further study for both academic and
policy purposes.  
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Thirteen interviews with young adults (seven female, six male) and 13 with
older adults (seven female, six male) were conducted in rural Qena, for a total
of 53 interviews. The distribution of the sample by location, generation,
gender, and access to social protection is shown in Table 2. It is worth
noting that considerable difficulty was met in identifying respondents of
this socioeconomic background who were employed in the private sector
with social protection (i.e. social insurance enrollment) among all groups
except male youth in Cairo. For this reason, self-employed individuals who
had enrolled themselves in social insurance were interviewed in place of
protected private sector employees in the older adult and rural categories,
and only one young woman in Cairo and one in Qena with protected
private sector jobs were located for an interview. Respondents in Cairo
were identified through a snowball sample starting from an interviewer
who lived in a sha’abi neighborhood, and respondents from Qena were
identified through the networks of a local NGO.

Table 2: Distribution of the qualitative sample, by location, gender, generation and social
protection status
Cairo
Female
Male
1
1
1
0
1
2

Younger Generation
Public sector employee, social protection
Public sector employee, no social protection
Private sector employee or self-employed, with
social protection
Private sector employee or self-employed, no
social protection
Unemployed or out of labor force§
Older Generation
Public sector employee, social protection*§
Private sector employee or self-employed, no
social protection
Self-employed, with social protection
Out of labor force§
Recipient of social assistance pension**

Qena
Female
Male
2
2
2
0
1
1

1

3

0

2

3

1

2

1

3
1

2
3

2
0

2
2

0
2
1

1
NA
NA

1
2
2

2
NA
NA

Notes: * Either currently employed in the public sector or receiving a contributory pension.
**Due to the difficulty of locating the small population of men receiving a non-contributory pension, this group
was excluded from the sample.
§ At least one of the female respondents in this category was receiving survivorship benefits at the time of the
interview.
14

Interviews covered the interviewee’s current and past employment
conditions, including social insurance coverage and other employmentrelated benefits such as health insurance. They also covered household
access to pensions and other forms of social protection, expectations
regarding retirement and old age support, generational comparisons
regarding access to social protection for today’s youth versus their parents’
generation, and a discussion of how important the extension and reform of
social protection programs should be for the post-January 25th revolution
government. Additional questions on the choice of whether or not to work
were included for women. The bulk of the fieldwork was conducted in June
and July 2011, with some additional interviews conducted in November
2011. All translations are the author’s.10

4. Results
This section presents the results of the interviews according to the
four generation/gender categories included in the study. For each group,
broad common life trajectories in relation to the labor market and access
to social protection mechanisms are discussed. The primary aim of the
analysis was to identify key vulnerabilities faced by each generation/gender
group, and the extent of their access to social protection mechanisms that
could alleviate those vulnerabilities. Perceptions of the value of different
forms of social protection are also addressed. The discussion focuses
on social insurance, health insurance and non-contributory pensions
(commonly known as Sadat and Mubarak pensions), as these are the three
most widespread forms of social protection in Egypt, and were the mostly
commonly accessed forms among the study population.11

10 Quotes have been lightly edited for readability.
11 Interview respondents were also asked about unemployment benefits, maternity leave (for women), and
aid from charities, religious organizations or other civil society. As noted above, there is a legal provision for
unemployment benefits for certain categories of Egyptian workers. However, the requirements are quite
restrictive (SSA 2011), and actual receipt of these benefits seems to be extremely rare. Those of the respondents who had heard of the concept associated it with political calls post-January 25th to provide aid to
Egypt’s unemployed youth. Many were adamant that at the current time such a thing existed only outside
Egypt. Outside the public sector, maternity leave is rare, and only one female respondent in the younger
generation had benefitted from it. None of the respondents said that they or any members of their household were currently benefitting from non-public forms of social assistance.
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4.1 Older men
The group of older men was split between two main life trajectories:
public sector employment, and employment, or self-employment, in
the informal economy. Among residents of Qena, the latter included
agricultural work. Educational levels for those in the informal sector
ranged from two-year technical post-secondary degrees to illiterate,
whereas three of the four public sector employees had at least a secondary
degree and one was an illiterate factory worker in Qena.
Government employment provided clear advantages to the men of this
generation in terms of stability and security, as well as access to social
protection. They were “appointed” in the government sector shortly
after finishing their education, and had remained in their jobs ever since.
All had social insurance and health insurance. These and other benefits
of government employment were widely acknowledged, and educated
respondents in particular lamented the difficulty faced by their children’s
generation in finding such jobs now that the public employment guarantees
were no longer in effect. The public sector was a less vivid comparison
point for the less educated, for whom opportunities in this sector have
always been lower, yet several also noted its advantages. All but one agreed
that employment opportunities for men had declined since they were
young.
Among the group that had not benefitted from public sector
employment, access to social protection through contributory social
insurance pensions was mixed, and none had health insurance. In the rural
study site, where the private sector is under-developed and education
levels among the older generation were low, the thought of enrolling in
social insurance had clearly never occurred to several of the respondents,
who neither understood the process nor had the income to pay the
contributions. The self-employed, “independent” workers who registered
themselves with social insurance did so because they were told to when
they went to get licenses for their work. They too had little understanding
of the system, and were unsure at what level they were considered to be
contributing, although they knew their monthly payment. 12 They were
also unsure of what their eventual pension value would be, but did not
expect much. Irregularity of contributions was also a problem among this
group, whose incomes varied from month-to-month, particularly given
their advanced age. At the time of the interview, a self-employer tile layer
in Qena, age 61, said he was unable to work due to health conditions and
12 Most of the self-employed interviewed through this project were making social insurance contributions at
the lowest possible self-declared income category, with a monthly contribution of 7.5LE (approximately
$1.25 at current exchange rates).
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said he had not paid his social insurance contributions for over a year. He
would be financially reliant on his son until he reached the self-employed
retirement age of 65, at which point he planned to rely on his pension.
However, he seemed unaware that his failure to make his contributions
during the intervening period could affect his pension eligibility.
Labor force discontinuity was also a problem in terms of social
protection access among the Cairo sample of informal sector workers;
all three of those who were uninsured at the time of the interview had,
at some point, been enrolled in the social insurance system but had
not met the minimum 120 months of contributions to be eligible for a
pension. Individuals are allowed to make up for any shortage in number of
contributions by “buying” those contributions from social insurance,13 but
these older workers faced challenges in coming up with such sums. Said
one man, age 53, who had left a job with social insurance and then tried to
reinvest in the system:
I thought about completing the insurance the way it was,
but I found they were telling me I don’t know how many
percent for the period that I wasn’t paying [my contributions],
so of course it’s not possible for me to go pay about six years
[worth], pay all that time that passed, with a fine as well.
Another man, age 56, became self-employed after working at a barber
shop for years where he was covered by social insurance. However, with
his reduced income as an independent worker he was unable to cover both
his contribution and what would have been his employer’s. Contributing
to social insurance also became a low priority. As he said “all my attention
is on feeding the kids.”
Although many of the men of this generation did not have access to
pensions, the abstract value of social insurance was recognized by all;
when asked whether they thought it was better to put a portion of their
salary into personal savings, a private pension fund or the public pension
system, all respondents said public pensions were the best option. Private
insurance is not well known in Egypt, and all said that it was not realistic
to expect that they would save money to provide for a retirement given the
financial pressures of supporting their households today. The disability and
survivor benefits provided to families by the public pension system were
also an important consideration for the more educated urban population.
Thus, the low level of understanding of social insurance did not seem to
translate into mistrust of the public system among this generation.
13 Interview with a representative of the Social Insurance Administration, 25 June 2012.

17

One consistently noted problem with pensions, however, was their low
value, which was widely said not to cover a household’s expenses. None
of those who were receiving or expected to receive a pension planned to
live on that income alone. As with those rural residents who did not have
a pension, several of the older men in Qena were relying or expected to
rely on their sons to make up for any household needs not covered by the
pension. In this context, where extended family and multi-generational
households are common and some households have agricultural land,
such informal forms of social protection in old age were more prominent
than in the urban study site. In Cairo, along with some of the other men
in Qena, this generation planned to secure their old age through selfemployment or informal employment. The idea of starting a small business
or “project” in older age was common, and those who were already selfemployed planned to continue working if they were able. Others were
already working in second jobs to supplement their pensions, or had jobs
lined up for when they retired.14 By definition, these jobs had to be in the
informal sector as it is not possible for those taking a pension to register
for social insurance coverage. For those with pensions, informal sector
employment thus served as a complement, rather than a supplement,
to social protection access. However, compared to those with no social
protection, pensioned retirees acknowledged that they had an important
degree of security. Said one retiree, 60, who had a car that he rented out as
a form of income generation, on preferring the pension system over other
forms of retirement support:
Even though it’s not enough, you know it’s guaranteed, there’s something
there at the end of the month, better than nothing. With independent
work in Egypt, you can come to the end of the month and there’s nothing
at all…or you could have to stay home, you get sick, or anything happens
and you have nothing…there’s a big difference of course.

4.2 Older women
Older women also tended to follow one of two main life trajectories:
public sector employment, or life as a housewife. However, as is common in
Egypt, several of those who had spent most of their lives as housewives had
also spent intermittent periods of time engaged in wage work or incomegenerating activities, particularly in the rural study site. Most of these had
engaged in petty trading, but one woman in Qena was currently working
in her family business, a mill, and one woman in Cairo was working in a
secretarial job. Both had re-entered the labor market within the last several
years before the interview, once their children were at least in preparatory
14 Egypt’s public sector has a mandatory retirement age of 60.
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school. As expected, family reasons – including household responsibilities,
childbearing and husband’s opposition – were the main reason for labor
force discontinuity among the older women, whereas labor market factors
were the main source of discontinuity among older men. Among this
generation of women, as with the older men, the only individuals who
had had steady employment since their youth were the public sector
employees. All of these older, female public sector employees had at least a
secondary degree. In Cairo, the educational level of housewives and those
engaged in the informal economy ranged from illiterate to post-secondary
vocational degrees. Among the housewives in Qena, none had completed
primary school and the majority could not read or write.
As with the older men, women of this generation engaged in public
sector employment enjoyed a considerable degree of stability and
privileged access to social protection relative to those who had never or
inconsistently been in the labor market. They benefitted from the public
sector’s generous maternity benefits, and although not all could afford
to take the longer unpaid leave for childrearing, the three government
employees who had children had all taken at least one three-month
leave. The fourth woman had been able to take early retirement at age
45 in order to care for her ailing husband. In addition to the other social
protection benefits that all public sector employees enjoyed, the fact that
the requirements of their family roles did not cause them to lose pension
benefits was certainly a considerable advantage of public employment
among this group. As with older men, the security of the public sector
was highly valued by these women, and they too saw the decline of
public sector hiring as a major social ill. Again, among the less educated
population, particularly in Qena, the sense of decline over time was less
linked to employment opportunities.
Another major benefit of the expansion of public employment for this
population of older women, regardless of their employment status, was
the survivor benefits they inherited from husbands who had worked in the
public sector. Although eligibility for survivor benefits was not among the
sampling criteria, it was found that all of the older women in Cairo who
were not receiving social assistance, and four of the five in Qena, were
currently receiving or could expect to receive survivor benefits from their
husband’s public sector pensions. For those who were themselves public
sector employees, these survivor benefits served (or were expected to
serve) as supplements to their own pensions. However, for those who were
housewives or working in the informal sector, these survivors pensions
were, or would be in the case of widowhood, their primary source of
income. Although many of the women in this generation, and particularly
those who were not public sector employees, also had a low understanding
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of the social insurance system, the fact that pensions were inheritable by
surviving widows and children was quite widely known.
Survivor benefits were such an important source of income support for
the older female respondents because, unlike the men of their generation,
they felt they had few options for income generation in their old age.
A combination of advanced age, health concerns, and social constraints
played into this. The women without education largely saw that they did
not have, and in fact had never really had, options for work in the wage
market. This was compounded in some cases by family and community
resistance to the idea of women’s work. In both study locations, even for
those who were public sector employees, the idea of starting a “project,” as
the men planned, was not an option they considered. Some women could
expect to receive additional support from their grown children (primarily
sons), although others still had dependent children who they were
supporting from inherited pensions. Thus, as one 61-year old explained,
“you live at the level of the money…you don’t spend beyond your means.”
This is not to say that this group of older women was satisfied with
pension levels, whether those were contributory, non-contributory, or
survivor benefits. Particularly for those receiving only survivor benefits
or non-contributory pensions it was clear that the amounts were not
sufficient to keep the household out of poverty. Perhaps for this reason,
inflation and the rising cost of living figured most prominently in most
women’s comparisons of their youth and the current time. The perception
that it had become much more difficult to provide for a family even on
nominally larger sums of money was a much more vivid aspect of the
perceived generational decline among this group than labor market factors.
Although there is no doubt that informal transfers alleviated the
situation of some of the female-headed households, several cases illustrated
the argument that those in most need may have limited networks in terms
of reaching better-off individuals able to give. For example, the Cairene
woman, age 62, who was receiving a non-contributory pension received
139LE (approximately $23) per month.15 She received occasional gifts of
foodstuffs from neighbors as well as money from her sons, two of whom
were self-employed carpenters and one of whom was a casual laborer (none
registered with social insurance). But at the same time, she sometimes
gave money to a daughter who had three children and whose husband was
not always able to provide for the family’s needs. Thus, while there was
a flow of goods and money within the extended family and sometimes
from others, none were in a strong enough economic position to pull
15 This respondent was the only one of the three receiving a non-contributory pension who started receiving
the pension while married. The other two women from Qena both started receiving the pension after they
were divorced.
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the respondent – or the family – out of poverty. It was also a common
perception among the respondents that non-contributory pensions were
only for divorcees and widows with no family support, and there was a
certain stigma attached to not being provided for fully by family networks,
particularly among the Cairo residents.
Still, despite the low amounts, the women of this generation valued the
public pension system highly and, like the men, saw it as superior to any
form of private saving for old age because it was something guaranteed.
The same could not be said of the health insurance system, which had
low value in the respondents’ eyes due to of the poor quality of service
at the public facilities to which patients must go in order for the health
insurance to cover their treatment:16
Unfortunately, the illness I had, health insurance won’t cover
the right treatment for it, because the health insurance
covers a certain amount and the treatment was more than
that amount, so they would give me something that wasn’t
appropriate…so I went and bought it [the medicine] from
outside – Public sector retiree (early retirement), age 58, Cairo
Health insurance is important but it’s not good here in my
village, I for example, I would go to the health insurance
[clinic] and every time they would say you’ll take an alternate
[treatment], there isn’t this, there isn’t this – Public sector retiree,
age 64, Qena
For this reason, most of those who had health insurance, either through
employment or survivor benefits, did not use it. Notably, some of these
same women said that their pension was not sufficient to cover their living
costs specifically because of the health expenses they incurred going to
other facilities. Unlike the respondent quoted above, the poor quality of
the health insurance system even led some older women to discount the
importance of having health insurance to begin with, as illustrated by this
exchange with a 50-year-old housewife receiving survivor benefits:
I: Did you get health insurance with the pension?
R: I refused to enroll, I refused, even though I’m sick, I go
to [another hospital]…my brother gets me the medicine, I just
went and did an ear exam, he was the one who got me the
16 The older male respondents also noted the poor quality of the health insurance, and also noted that they
did not use their insurance, but the issue figured less prominently than in discussions with women. Access to
health insurance was also less common among the older males, since many of the older women had health
insurance through their survivor benefits.
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medicine….health insurance isn’t good…..because they take a
lot of money, from the one [female] who has a pension, they
take a lot of money from her pension….they take 40LE per
month whether she gets any treatment or not
I: So you don’t want health insurance at all?
R: No, I go outside [the health insurance system], I don’t want it,
I go elsewhere
The public health insurance system was thus doing little to reduce
vulnerability to large health care expenditures among this older population,
who resorted to spending part of their already limited pensions on health
care, or relying on family transfers to cover health expenses.

4.3 Male youth
For male youth in both study locations, the stable life path of longterm public sector employment followed by the older generation (who
were of their fathers’ generation) was more of an ideal than a reality. This
generation was significantly more educated than the older men; only one
youth in Qena had less than a secondary education, and all of those in
Cairo had at least a two-year post-secondary degree.17 Nearly all would
have qualified for government jobs during their fathers’ time. Yet with
the system of government hiring effectively closed, their employment
experiences were more varied than the older generation’s and much less
strictly divided between public and informal employment. All of these
male youth said that opportunities for finding good quality jobs had
declined significantly since their fathers’ time and were extremely limited
for their generation. Facing the pressure of supporting young families or
trying to save for marriage, salary and job security dominated this group’s
thinking about quality employment, with social protection often a fairly
distant consideration.
The public sector was still something of a labor market option for these
young men, but had lost some of its key benefits, including that of easy
access to all graduates. In Qena, where all of the young men interviewed
saw the public sector as the best form of employment, such positions were
said to be very difficult to get, requiring connections or substantial bribes
17 Educational attainment in Egypt has risen considerably over the course of these two generations. Whereas
about 55% of men born between 1953 – 1962 (the older generation in this study) obtained less than a
secondary education, among the 1983 – 1988 birth cohorts (near the ages of the younger generation in this
study) this declined to 38%. Among women of the same generations, the corresponding figures are about
72% and 41%, respectively (Sieverding 2011). Nevertheless, the sample of youth in this study may be biased
toward the more educated due to the sampling criteria, as noted in the methods discussion.
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to secure. Both of the two young men working in the public sector in this
location got their jobs through the preferential hiring system for children
of current government employees (abna a’mileen). Even then, one had been
hired on a temporary contract and was only given a permanent position
after the January 25th revolution during the brief wave of government
efforts to give youth better access to the public sector. The young man
in Cairo working for a public sector agency was similarly on a temporary
contract and did not know whether he would be upgraded to a permanent
position. For other male youth in Cairo, the advantages of government
employment had declined to the point that several had left contract-based
public sector jobs for the informal private sector. The key factor in this
decision was the higher salary they were offered in the informal job.
In Qena, those youth who had not secured public sector employment
had either given up on or never really considered the idea of social
insurance; as far as they were concerned, the formal private sector was
non-existent. One said that he was not even aware you could get social
insurance if you were not a government employee. The one young man
who had social insurance through a means other than government
employment was a 29-year-old shop owner who had insured himself and
the shop. When asked why, he explained that he did not really understand
the system, but one of the village elders had told him that this was the best
thing for him to do, and had completed the paperwork for him and told
him which contribution level was best.
In Cairo, in contrast, most of the young men interviewed had had
at least one job where they were covered by social insurance. However,
discontinuity of employment, even more so than among the older male
informal workers, was a major factor among this group. Most had worked
multiple jobs since finishing their education, punctuated by periods of
unemployment, in a continual search for a job that was better paid, more
suited to their qualifications, and in which they were better treated. Youth
were also willing to leave their current employment as soon as they found
something better. As a result of this turnover, they did not necessarily
think that they would benefit from the periods of employment during
which they had contributed to the social insurance system. Even if one
employer insured them, the next may well not, leading youth to expect
that any social insurance contributions they did make would effectively
be money lost.
This instability of employment, including highly personalized
relationships between employee and employer, dominated the Cairo
youth’s perceptions of the private sector. Their feelings of insecurity also
affected their bargaining position vis a vis their employers in terms of
gaining access to social insurance through their work, and few seemed
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willing to bring up the subject. One 30-year-old, who described six previous
positions in the nine years since he had graduated with his B.A., described
the situation in his current job in a restaurant:
I: Your employer doesn’t insure anyone at the restaurant?
R: Recently some people went and caused a problem with
him, so the social insurance [inspector] came and filed a report
and that kind of thing, so it looks like he’ll take two or three
[employees] and insure them.
I: Not everyone? You didn’t negotiate with [the owner] to
insure you?
R: I...in terms of him [the owner]…the negative effects of
the revolution are there, that the cafes and restaurants are
just getting by…here the way it goes, they say ‘hey, there’s a
revolution, I’m going to get rid of that guy I don’t like, there’s
a revolution, let’s lower salaries’….
Under this situation, with his salary already reduced to about half, the
young man was not willing to join his colleagues in their negotiation for
social insurance.
Another 33-year-old teacher worked for a private school that reported
less than a quarter of his salary to social insurance. Although this young
man was under the impression that he was paying both his share of the
insurance contribution and his employer’s, or 40% of his reported salary,18
he had not brought the issue up with the employer:
I: So there weren’t any negotiations between you and your
employer or the school administration, that they would
increase your insurance [reported salary]?
R: Not at all! When the social insurance [inspector] comes
it’s like an exam, there’s this fright from the inspector, and
they go around to some of the employees and choose some of
them – and I’ve been one of them a couple of times: “You’ll be
asked, are you insured? Yes, I’m insured”
I: They [the inspectors] don’t ask how much [of the salary] is
insured?
R: No, no. Most of the time the inspector from the social
insurance just goes to the school administration and everything
is done [i.e. he is paid off]…..
18 It was not possible to verify this employee’s claim that his employer was deducting the entire 40% from his
salary, but a quick calculation of his approximate contribution and reported salary suggested that this was
not in fact the case.
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Although he would have liked to have a larger portion of his salary
reported, since it was a good salary the teacher was not willing to leave
the job over this issue. Several of the young men interviewed, as well as
some of the older adults in Cairo, also said that it was common practice in
the private sector to have employees sign an undated official resignation
(known as istima’ara sita or “Form 6”) at the same time that they signed
work contracts and were registered with social insurance. In this manner,
the employer effectively bypassed labor law clauses protecting employees
from arbitrary dismissal at the same time that he formally registered the
employee.
For most of the youth, such concerns with job security and wages
outweighed the issue of social protection. Yet when asked whether public
social insurance, private pension funds, or personal savings were the best
way to save for retirement, young men in both study locations, like the
older generation, overwhelmingly said that public social insurance was the
best option. They saw saving on their low salaries as nearly impossible, and
mistrusted the idea of private pension funds, much like they mistrusted
private sector employers. Said one youth in Qena, “I prefer the government,
if it’s a private group the one responsible for the insurance may take the
money and run. But with the government, the money is there.” Young men
also said that government pensions would provide for their families in case
of their death.
Nevertheless, the desire for social insurance conflicted with the realities
of the labor market and more immediate income needs, as illustrated by
one 26-year-old worker in a print shop in Cairo:
He [my employer] wanted to insure me, but I refused because
it will deduct 14% from my salary. My base salary is 1000LE,
so if he deducts 14% it will be 140LE, and those 140LE will
make a difference for me – I am a man getting ready for
marriage and those 140LE, if I went into a gameiya [ROSCA]
with them they’ll make something…so it’s not the time for it
[i.e. insurance]
When the same young man, later in the interview, said that social
insurance was one of the benefits he would like to receive through his job,
he explained the apparent contradiction in his refusal, “it’s not that I don’t
want it [social insurance], of course I want something like that, but I won’t
take from my salary and affect my [current] situation for insurance that I
won’t take, or that I won’t see its benefit except in the far future.”
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In light of the reality that many were not insured – and also well aware
of the fact that pension values are low – most of these young men expected
to follow the model of the older generation and support themselves in
old age through continued informal employment or self-employment. Yet
their ideas of future support were vague, conditioned by uncertainty and
low standards of living. Under the difficult economic conditions these
young men faced, this uncertainty also surrounded their ideas of how their
parents would be supported in their old age, as illustrated by this extended
dialogue with a 29-year-old, married government employee in Qena:
I: Your father, will your father’s pension be enough [to support
the household]?
R: I don’t know….his income will be average, they’ll take away
the bonuses and allowances [when he retires]
I: How will they [your parents] provide for themselves?
R: God will provide for them, God willing.
I: Is it expected that you’ll help him?
R: No, that was before. Now everyone goes along [spends]
according to his situation.
I: You yourself, when you retire, how will you spend on your
family?
R: The same thing, from the pension.
I: Do you expect the pension will be enough?
R: No…I could do a project, later, from the pension that I’ll
take, from the end-of-service reward…I don’t really think of
these things, I think day-by-day.
I: Why do you think day-by-day? Why don’t you plan ahead?
R: Like I told you, I spend everything I make, in this situation,
with all my expenses….
I: Do you feel secure, because you have a [government] job?
R: No I don’t feel secure, and the salary, it’s just barely enough.
Several of the young men in Qena and Cairo were already in fact helping
to provide for parents who were living with them in multi-generational
households, although expectations for parental support were less
prominent among the Cairo group, most of whose parents had access to a
pension. Other young men felt they would be financially unable to provide
much support to their parents; one young man in Qena acknowledged that
while he should help his parents, his income was so stretched providing
for his own children that he was not sure whether he would be able
to do so. The restaurant employee in Cairo quoted above said that his
parents were more often the ones helping to support him. Thus, while
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there were certainly intergenerational transfers flowing both to and from
this generation of young men, their overall feeling of economic insecurity
contributed to considerable uncertainty over how either they or their
parents would provide for their old age.

4.4 Female youth
For female youth, the stable path of government employment that
women of the older generation (who were again also of their mothers’
generation) had followed was as distant a possibility as it was for the
male youth. Whereas the older generation of women was divided largely
between public sector employees and housewives, the younger women,
like the younger men, therefore had more variable labor force experiences.
Though generally split between those who worked in the informal sector
and those who withdrew from the labor force, even this boundary was more
blurred, as many of those out of the labor force were willing to work if they
found jobs that met certain conditions. Like the male youth, this group of
young women was considerably more educated than the older generation,
with only one woman in Qena not having completed secondary school,
and all of those in Cairo with at least a two-year post-secondary degree.
Unlike the other groups in the study, education conditioned these young
women’s views on change in labor force opportunities for women. All of
the young women in Cairo said that work opportunities had been better
for their mother’s generation, and those in Qena agreed as far as educated
women were concerned. But, since many of their mothers had not been
educated, they thought that they personally had better opportunities for
work due to their educational credentials and greater social acceptance
of women’s work in their villages. Nevertheless, the difficult conditions
of the private sector labor market made all of these young women’s longterm prospects for work quite uncertain.
As expected, concerns over treatment at work from supervisors
and colleagues, the appropriateness of the job for women, working
hours, and distance from home dominated these young women’s ideas
of what constituted quality employment. Salary also figured into their
considerations, particularly among those in Cairo, several of whom felt
that usual salary levels for the types of job available to them were simply
not enough to make working worthwhile. However, benefits such as social
and health insurance were rarely mentioned in young women’s descriptions
of important working conditions. When asked why not, one 29-year-old
woman in Cairo responded “I guess because I work in the private sector
and I got used to the fact that these things aren’t available.” Similarly, a
25-year-old teacher in Qena responded, “it’s not that these things are not
important but it is just fairytale talk!”
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In fact, for the young working women, social insurance, health insurance,
maternity leave, and paid vacation or sick days were not always available
even in the public sector. The teacher in Qena, for example, worked on a
temporary basis in a public preparatory school for 199LE (approximately
$33) per month. She described her work conditions:
We get fired [contract severed] for four months every year, so
that they don›t have to pay us for the time when school is
out, and also so that we don›t continue for five years with this
scheme so they don›t have to hire us [with a contract]. Then
they rehire us when school year begins. They deduct 2-3 LE
for every day that I miss work. We are not even entitled to
vacations, no insurance, and no pension.
Another young woman in Qena worked in a nursery affiliated with a
public school on a class-by-class basis, receiving a wage of 2LE per class,
and one young woman in Cairo had an administrative job at a university
where she was also paid by the day. At the time of the interview, she was
unemployed during the summer vacation, waiting to see if she would be
re-hired during the coming academic year. As with the male youth, these
female youth said that obtaining a government job with a contract and
benefits required connections (wasta) or a parent in the public sector who
could get them hired through the children of employees scheme.
Although most of the young women who had ever worked in the private
sector had simply given up on – or never in fact thought about – the idea of
employment benefits, the experiences of those who were enrolled in social
insurance, or had the option to be enrolled, revealed a deep mistrust of
private sector employers compounded by a poor understanding of how the
social insurance system works. One 25-year-old woman in Qena, currently
unemployed, had previously worked in a nursery. She said she had had
the option to enroll in social insurance, but didn’t understand the system
and wasn’t willing to part with the money for the contribution, which she
thought were just deductions that she would not see again. Another 27-yearold’s experience with her employer in Qena demonstrated both private
sector evasion of social insurance laws and young women’s suspicion that
they will never benefit from the contributions being deducted from them:
The insurance should be 40% of the salary, and according to
the law, the employee bears 14% of the cost and the employer
26%. So there was a problem, the organization didn’t have
the money to pay the 26% of the reported salary, so they said
they’ll take from us the whole amount. So what would make
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me pay half of my salary, a little bit less, for insurance? Which
I may or may not take in the end [as a pension]?
The organization eventually agreed to pay its part of the contribution,
on a reported salary of 200LE per month, whereas the employee was
actually making 750LE per month. She said she was not happy with
this situation because this level of contribution would yield a very small
pension, but at the same time would have preferred not to enroll in social
insurance at all. She explained:
I: So, you told me you were forced to enroll in social insurance?
R: Yes, because the organization made me.
I: But now you’re saying you want them to report your whole
salary?
R: Yes, if I’m going to have insurance, then it should be
something good, something that we’ll take a pension at the
end. But why bother for such a small value?
Unlike this young woman and her colleagues, most young women
were hesitant to negotiate or even open the topic of benefits with their
employers. One 29-year-old in Cairo was also insured at a lower salary than
she actually received, although she did not know at exactly how much,
and was also under the impression that all 40% of the contribution was
being deducted from her salary.19 She said she wished she had had health
insurance to cover a recent pregnancy, but had never discussed the issue
with her employer, a tourist company. As, she said, “you just sign [the
contract] because there is no work…. I haven’t tried to do anything about
the insurance, they just say ‘bring your papers for the social insurance.”
Surprisingly, knowledge of social insurance was low even among those
young women who had public sector benefits. None of the three young
women with government contracts knew whether or not they were
enrolled in social insurance. One young woman in Qena, age 22, who
was a permanent public sector employee and therefore by definition had
full benefits, explained why she didn’t find the idea of social insurance
important and did not think she was enrolled:
First of all, because we don’t understand it. We haven’t seen
what social insurance is really, so because of this I even don’t
participate, because I don’t know what social insurance is.
Except for the term – I hear the term social insurance but I
19 Again, this could not be verified, but a rough calculation suggested that it was not the case.
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don’t know what it means. And I haven’t benefitted from it, I
mean, if I have social insurance, me and my family, what will
that look like? So I don’t care if I have it or not because I don’t
understand it.
She had never asked about her benefits, and did not know that
contributions for these benefits were being deducted from her salary,
because she had never checked her employment conditions. Another young
woman in Cairo, age 33 and working in the government on a temporary
contract, said that deductions were made from her salary but she was not
sure if she would get a pension:
I: Do they deduct social insurance from your salary?
R: Yes, they always deduct things.
I: Do you know how much they deduct?
R: No, I don’t know, I don’t have any information on what
they deduct or not, they told us that we get a pension but
there are people who say that those on contracts don’t get a
pension after they finish, that that’s the difference between us
and those who have permanent jobs, the pension.
I: You didn’t ask?
R: No, I didn’t ask. But they [colleagues] say that I’ll get a
pension, I asked them once when a big deduction was taken
from my salary, and they said it’s a deduction for the pension.
I’m not sure if that information was right or not.
Awareness of social insurance and other forms of social protection
was similarly low among those not working. Most of the young women,
whether employed or not, saw health insurance and maternity leave as
more important than social insurance in the abstract, as these forms of
social protection addressed their and their children’s immediate needs.
However, very few had ever had access to such benefits.20 Some young
women also saw less reason to contribute to social insurance because they
did not expect to be employed for long periods due to family demands,
and consequently expected to lose any contributions paid. Egyptian law
20 Among the younger women interviewed, only one, the 29-year-old employed in a private tourism company,
had ever taken maternity leave. Her company granted her the legal three months with full pay, and she said
that she took the first two without difficulty. However, the January 25th revolution then occurred, and when
she went to pick up the check for the third month she was given only half her salary, with the justification
that the revolution had caused financial problems for the company. She was then placed on five months
of unpaid leave without her consent, and at the time of the interview was still waiting to see whether she
could return to her job.
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provides a provision for women who withdraw from the labor force due
to marriage to withdraw their social insurance contributions, but young
women were unaware of this.21
Aside from general lack of knowledge, part of what contributed to
young women’s lack of concern with social protection was the norm of
male providership, which was particularly strong in Qena. This applied
both in terms of the expectation that their brothers would bear primary
responsibility for supporting aging parents if needed, and in the expectation
that their husbands would be financially responsible for providing for their
own households through retirement. To the extent that they could answer
questions about how they would provide for themselves in the event of
widowhood, most expected to rely on survivor benefits. In the face of the
reality that many (potential) husbands today are not contributing to social
insurance, they had little to say. As one young woman, age 26 and working
in the informal sector, responded “I won’t have a pension, there isn’t any
stability for me. I’ll live from my husband’s work or my husband’s pension,
and if he doesn’t have, honestly I don’t know. There isn’t anything. There
won’t be any security.”

5. Discussion
This paper presents a comparative analysis of how four age/gender
groups perceive of and access social protection in Egypt: older men and
women age 50 – 65, and male and female youth aged 20 – 33. Though
different issues in terms of access to social insurance, health insurance and
non-contributory pensions were more prominent in discussions with each
of the different groups, several common vulnerabilities emerged across
generations and genders. These included labor force discontinuity among
workers in the private sector, women’s dependence on survivor benefits,
low pension values, and poor quality of and limited access to health
insurance. Finally, lack of awareness of social protection mechanisms and
poor understanding of how they function served as an important barrier
to access among all groups. In this section, these sources of vulnerability
are discussed and policy recommendations for addressing them are put
forward.

21 Interview with a representative from the Social Insurance Agency, 25 June 2012. There are also stricter conditions for men to withdraw their social insurance contributions, including reaching retirement age without
having made enough contributions, imprisonment, and emigration. Again, this was not something respondents in this study seemed aware of.
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1. Labor force discontinuity
Those workers who were unable to secure permanent government or
formal private sector jobs often experienced a considerable amount of job
turnover in the informal sector. This was particularly true among young
men. This group was still early on in their careers and had the chance,
at least among those in Cairo, to eventually find a stable formal job and
become eligible for a contributory pension. Yet until they felt they were
in such a secure, life-long job, youth were ambivalent about formalization.
Social insurance was a low priority in the difficult search for a good job,
and unless they expected to stay in one place long-term, they did not
necessarily see the sense in making social insurance contributions that
might not yield a pension. Although quite rational in the immediate
term, this meant that some were giving up the opportunity to make
contributions that might in fact have helped them accumulate the 120
months of contributions needed for pension eligibility.
Part of what this suggests is that workers need better education on the
eligibility requirements for receiving a contributory pension, including the
120 month requirement and how periods of missed payments are dealt with.
These issues of awareness will be discussed more below. However, broader
reforms are also needed to encourage social insurance participation among
informal workers and eliminate penalties for discontinuous enrollment in
social insurance. A reform of the social insurance law (Law 135 of 2010)
was in fact passed by the Egyptian parliament in 2010. This law included
a reduction in the employee contribution level to 11% and eliminated a
cap on pensionable salary, effectively lowering contribution levels for lowearning workers and raising them for high-earning ones. Importantly, the
law also included a minimum pension clause, which will make all citizens
age 65 or older with no other form of support eligible for a pension equal to
15% of the national average wage.22 This could provide an important safety
net for older workers in the informal sector for whom it is already too
late to become vested in the social insurance system. However, although
Law 135 was scheduled to come into effect in January 2012, its status is
currently unclear due to the aftermath of the January 25th, 2011 revolution.
Addressing the status of this law and other reforms to the social insurance
system should thus be on the agenda of the new government.

22 For more information on Law 135, please see: http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/intl_
update/2010-07/index.html#egypt and the ISSA’s Social Security Observer 13: http://news.issa.int/layout/
set/print/newsletter/newsletter_repository/observer/en/social_security_observer_13#5729
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2. Women’s dependence on survivor benefits
Due to the low labor force participation rate, particularly in the formal
sector, of Egyptian women, their individual access to contributory pensions
is fairly low. Yet for the older women in this study, the provision for survivor
benefits for widows meant that the expansion of public sector employment
provided many with social protection through employed male relatives.
The younger generation of women, who had even less personal access to
formal public sector employment than the older generation, also expected
to depend on such benefits if their husband was not alive to provide for
the household. However, given the high level of informality among the
generation of young men, barring significant formalization, these women
may be left with no formal income support in case of widowhood.
In order to provide social protection to women directly, rather
than relying on the increasingly tenuous prospect of survivor benefits,
efforts should be made to expand the reach of social assistance. The full
implementation of the minimum pension clause in Law 135 could be an
important step toward reducing vulnerability among older widows who
do not have access to survivor benefits. However, additional expansions
to the social assistance system are also important to reach women under
age 65 in vulnerable households. Currently, non-contributory pensions are
not widely received in Egypt, and were found to be somewhat stigmatized
among the study population, particularly in Cairo, due to the perception
that they are primarily for divorcees, or other women with no male provider
(for more on gender, stigma and targeting, see Sabates-Wheeler and Kabeer
2003). While social assistance should certainly continue to cover younger
widows and divorcees of all ages, expanding its effective reach at least
to other groups of non-elderly women might help de-stigmatize social
assistance while reaching a greater percentage of the poor. An expansion
of social assistance through the use of conditional cash transfer programs,
which are currently being piloted on a small scale in Upper Egypt, should
also be further explored.23

3. Low pension values
Among those men and women of the older generation who were receiving pensions, the value of their pensions was seen by most to be insufficient to support their households. Although sons have traditionally been
the primary form of old age support in Egypt (Yount et al. 2012), and certainly continue to play an important role, the findings of this study suggest
that in some poor households the younger generation may be too finan23 The CCT program is being piloted by the Ministry of Social Solidarity in collaboration with UNICEF and the
American University in Cairo. See: http://www.aucegypt.edu/research/src/Pages/CCT.aspx
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cially stretched to provide significant support to their parents.24 Reliance
on informal mechanisms to make up for insufficient pensions, or lack of
pension access altogether, may thus still leave households quite vulnerable
to unexpected circumstances or expenses. In this context, respondents
did not think of informal networks as a substitute for formal social protection, but rather as a safety net to make up for income shortages after
pensions were spent.
Indeed, many pension values, and particularly non-contributory pensions, are not sufficient to keep households above the poverty line. In order not to further reduce incentives to participate in social insurance, reforms should be implemented to bring contributory pension values more
in line with the cost of living. Again, this was an issue addressed in Law
135 that should be further studied and acted upon by the new government.
Bringing non-contributory pension levels up to the poverty line, if not
above it, will require greater investment from the state. The adequacy of
the proposed level of the minimum pension in Law 135 for keeping households out of poverty will also require study.

4. Poor quality of and limited access to health insurance
Another important element of vulnerability to unexpected life events
among those interviewed in this study is the lack of access to quality
health insurance. Access to health insurance at all was found to be limited
to permanent or contracted public sector employees and those receiving
survivor benefits. Most of the young households therefore had no access
to health insurance, which several saw as a more important issue than
access to social insurance due to their immediate need for health care for
themselves and their young children. Among those older individuals who
did have access to health insurance, the poor quality of service at public
health insurance facilities was a consistent complaint, and led many to
seek treatment in other facilities outside the health insurance system.
With advancing age, these health care expenditures placed a considerable
burden on the household. Further research focused specifically on the
issue of health insurance access and quality, with the aim of identifying
how coverage can be expanded and existing facilities improved, is greatly
needed in this context.

5. Lack of awareness
Finally, although in some contexts it has been suggested that mistrust
of the government may discourage workers from participating in formal
24 Yount et al. (2012) similarly find that older Egyptians in Ismailia more commonly made downward intergenerational transfers than received upward ones
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social protection schemes (Maloney 2004), this study suggests that in
Egypt this is not the case. On the contrary, nearly all of those interviewed
for the study, regardless of age, gender or rural/urban residence, saw the
government as the most reliable and trustworthy institution for providing
a retirement fund. The fact that respondents expressed their confidence in
the government social insurance system shortly after the greatest political
upheaval Egypt has experienced in decades, as well as during a time when
accusations of corruption within the former regime were widespread, is
even more striking.
In contrast, many of the respondents expressed a deep mistrust
of the private sector, and not without reason. As interviews with the
young generation in particular demonstrated, violations of labor law are
widespread, and reportedly included lack of contracts and social insurance
registration, under-reporting of salaries to social insurance, attempts to
pay employer’s social insurance contributions from employee’s salaries,
arbitrary salary reductions, deductions for sick days, and requiring
employees to sign undated official resignations, effectively forfeiting their
rights in case of dismissal. Faced with this level of insecurity, and in the
context of high unemployment, youth were reluctant to negotiate with
their employers over any kind of benefits.
Both youth and the older generation were also in a disadvantaged
position because may did not know their labor rights in order to negotiate
them. A significant number of respondents, particularly in the rural
location and among women, were unconcerned with social insurance
because they did not understand it. Even some of those who were enrolled
in social insurance were unaware of their contribution levels, requirement
for number of monthly contributions and that missed payments can be
made up for, and what their eventual pension value might be – or even if
they would get a pension. Perhaps most importantly, they did not ask.
Building an environment in which workers, and particularly young
workers, are able to access the employment-based social protection benefits
to which they have a right is of course a complex issue that requires, among
other things, effective enforcement of labor law. However, one fairly direct
measure that should be undertaken immediately is awareness campaigns.
Providing workers, and, importantly, women who are out of the labor
force, information about different social protection mechanisms could at
least bring them to the point of knowing what benefits they should be
entitled to, and hopefully spread awareness of the importance of social
protection.25 For the self-employed, accurate information about their
25 Among older workers in the United States, for example, Liebman and Luttner (2010) find some evidence
that fairly simple informational campaigns regarding social security can lead to changes in labor force behavior.
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eligibility for social insurance and the different contribution levels might
encourage enrollment. Providing information about social assistance
programs and their eligibility criteria to targeted groups is also important
as a means to reach the most vulnerable, who are likely to be out of the
labor market. Egypt is currently in a phase in which information sharing
and citizen’s rights have become more prominent issues than in any time
in recent memory. This opportunity should be seized to address issues
of social protection, workers’ rights, and poverty reduction during this
critical transition.
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